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Abstract
There is evidence that experience premium differs across indus-
tries. We propose a theoretical model for explaining these differences.
We assume that labor mobility brings external knowledge to the firm,
which increases its productivity. We find that industry experience
premium is decreasing in inter-firm mobility costs, while increasing
in the learning-by-doing and the technological level of the industry.
Moreover, it has a U-shape relationship with the level of learning-
by-hiring, the substitutability between different types of experienced
workers and the variety of knowledge in the industry. Results are con-
sistent with the empirical findings that R&D-intensive industries have
steeper wage profiles.
JEL Classification: J24; J31; J61
Keywords: labor mobility, industry experience premium, wage growth,
learning-by-hiring.
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1 Introduction
There is evidence that experience premium differs across industries. This
paper proposes a theoretical explanation for these inter-industry differences
in experience premium. In our model, the level of labor mobility across firms
influences the experience premium. Consequently, the determinants of labor
mobility affect also the experience premium of the industry.
There are four main assumptions in our model. First, mobility of work-
ers within an industry induces knowledge diffusion. That is, workers have
embodied knowledge and when they move between firms their knowledge
travels with them. Evidence on the transfer of knowledge through labor mo-
bility (learning-by-hiring) refers specially to the mobility of technical or R&D
personnel in high-tech or R&D intensive industries (Saxenian, 1994; Zucker
et al., 1998; Almeida and Kogut, 1999). In our model only experienced work-
ers may have incentives to move between firms.
Second, we assume that all the knowledge learned in the firms is industry-
specific. In such a case, experienced workers do not have economic incentives
to move to another industry, since their knowledge would be of no value
there. Therefore, there is no mobility of workers across industries. Sullivan
(2008)’s results indicate that knowledge is industry-specific for managers and
professionals, although it is not so for blue collar workers. Notice that since
industry experience premium is the return to the learning relevant to the
industry, it would not exist without industry-specific knowledge.
Third, we assume that heterogeneity of knowledge brings extra produc-
tivity to the firm. There is evidence that innovation comes easier when there
is exchange of knowledge among scientists, technicians or researchers in gen-
eral (Peri, 2005; Leonard and Sensiper, 1998; Ettlie, 1980; Sakakibara, 1997).
Different points of view or different expertises together may innovate faster
than a homogeneous group of workers. Furthermore, the latter literature
emphasizes tacit knowledge, which requires face-to-face contact among in-
dividuals. We introduce this observation in our model by assuming that
workers can exchange knowledge only within the firm.
Finally, it is assumed that markets are perfectly competitive, so workers
are paid their marginal productivity. We solve first for the industry equilib-
rium and then perform a comparative static analysis to get the inter-industry
results.
This paper makes two main contributions. Firstly, we provide a theory on
differences in wage growth across industries. New industry characteristics are
introduced that had not been considered in the literature, namely learning-
by-hiring, mobility costs, learning-by-doing, variety of knowledge and com-
plementarity of experienced workers. Secondly, we propose an alternative
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way of modeling inter-firm labor mobility within the neoclassical framework,
which leads to an extended Total Factor Productivity. In particular, we ob-
tain that the TFP depends on the technological level, the learning-by-doing
and the composition of labor within the firm.
Our paper contributes to two open controversies. The first controversy
is about which economic theory prevails in explaining wage growth. The
second controversy refers to the empirical relevance of firm, industry and
general experience on wage growth.
Regarding the first controversy, there are three main theories that explain
wage growth.1 According to the human capital theory, the wage growth is
explained by worker’s productivity growth, through training or learning-by-
doing (Becker, 1962). Industries which offer more training should provide
a steeper wage profile according to this theory. Moreover, human capital
theory predicts that firm-specific training leads to both, a steeper wage pro-
file and lower labor mobility. Lazear (1981) proposes a second theory, the
delayed compensation theory. He argues that firms postpone part of the pay-
ment to motivate workers to work hard in the first period. In this case,
we would observe steeper profiles in those industries where worker’s effort
is less observable. Third, and within the matching theory, incomplete infor-
mation on worker’s productivity may explain why wages grow with tenure
(Jovanovic, 1979). In this case, wage growth is purely a result of the quality
of matching. All of these theories predict that workers who are offered a
steeper wage profile should be less likely to leave the firm. We add an al-
ternative theory to this controversy. Although our paper conforms with the
human capital theory, since wage growth comes from an increase in worker’s
productivity, we propose a model where it is compatible to have a steep wage
profile and a high level of labor mobility. Our results are consistent with the
evidence found in Levine (1993) that establishments with high returns to
tenure do not have low levels of labor turnover.
The second controversy is about the empirical relevance of firm, indus-
try, occupation and general experience on wage growth. There is a handful
of empirical studies showing that differences in returns to industry tenure
exist. Neal (1995), Parent (2000) and Sullivan (2008) support the role of
industry tenure on the wage scheme. They give evidence that workers re-
ceive compensation for industry-specific skills instead of firm-specific skills.
According to their results worker’s experience in an industry and not firm
tenure matters for the wage profile. Moreover, Sullivan distinguishes the
industry experience effect for different occupations and finds that it is sig-
1For some examples of papers testing these theories see Altonji and Shakotko (1987),
Abraham and Farber (1987), Barth (1997) and Brown (1989).
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nificant for managers (23% wage increase after five years of experience in
an industry) and for professionals (14.3% of wage growth after five years in
the industry), while it is much lower for other occupations. Using German
data Dustmann and Meghir (2005) find that returns to industry tenure are
1% per year for skilled workers and zero for the unskilled. They also find,
however, that general experience pays substantially more to skilled workers,
while firm tenure provides high returns to unskilled workers. Allen (2001)
gives evidence that wage growth varies across industries. This is the only
paper we are aware of that explicitly allows for differences in wage growth
across industries. One of his results is that R&D-intensive industries have
steeper wage profiles than industries with little R&D activity. Our model is
consistent with this result and proposes some other industry characteristics
that should be taken into account when studying wage growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the model of an industry with labor mobility and knowledge diffusion. Sec-
tion 3 describes the symmetric equilibrium. In section 4 results are presented,
first the solution for the case of zero mobility costs and then the comparative
static analysis with positive mobility costs. In section 5 we briefly discuss
the main limitations of the model. In section 6 we conclude the paper.
2 The model
Consider an industry with Ft firms each period. They are identical in every-
thing except that each firm has a different type of knowledge. All types of
knowledge are useful only within the industry (industry-specific). We assume
segmented labor markets in the sense that there is a fixed supply of labor
per industry.2
Workers live for two periods and each generation has a measure Nt of
individuals ready to work in a particular industry. When individuals are
young they work in a firm as unexperienced workers. By working in the
firm they learn the specific knowledge of the firm without any cost (learning-
by-doing), so that, at the beginning of the next period, there is a positive
amount of senior workers with the knowledge developed in each firm. We
call them experienced workers.
In each period firms may hire their own experienced workers and external
experienced workers. Denote by λjit the amount of experienced workers from
firm j that are hired by firm i at period t, j 6= i. As already stated above, they
have embodied knowledge type j. We call them poached workers. Similarly,
2As we argue in the end of section 3, this assumption, although it may seem very
restrictive, does not affect our results.
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let ηit be the amount of own experienced workers hired by the same firm i at
period t, which have knowledge type i. We call them retained workers.
The production function of each firm is Yit = H
α
it(BtLit)
(1−α) where Hit
is a measure of effective units of human capital, Bt is a measure of the
productivity level of young workers and Lit is the total young employment of
firm i (i = 1, ...F ). We define human capital as an asymmetric CES function
on all types of experienced workers hired by the firm.
Hit = [(ηitAit)
σ + p
∑
j 6=i
(λjitAjt)
σ]1/σ, (1)
where Ajt is a measure of the knowledge of the type-j worker and p is a
parameter which lies between 0 and 1 and measures the ability of learning-
by-hiring of the firm.3
We assume that Ait > Bt−1, which means that workers learn while work-
ing in the firm. We refer to it as learning-by-doing. In contrast, learning-by-
hiring refers to the ability of a firm to acquire external knowledge through hir-
ing external workers (poaching). We consider it may be limited by three main
factors: the intrinsic characteristics of the knowledge in question (whether it
is firm or industry-specific); the degree of capacity of firms to acquire such
external knowledge (concept of absorptive capability of firms developed by
Cohen and Levinthal (1990)), and finally, the type of environment where
firms develop their tasks (e.g. institutions, local legal system which may
enforce or not clauses not-to-compete, strongly defend trade secrets, etc.).4
When one or several of these factors diminish the potential of learning-by-
hiring, the parameter p will be low, and vice versa.
Knowledge in our model has two dimensions: variety and level of knowl-
edge. The subindex i in Ait indicates the type of knowledge (in which firm the
worker learned his knowledge), while the level of knowledge is indicated by
the particular value of Ait. In general the level of knowledge may be different
across firms. Variety of knowledge is ensured by assuming that each firm has
a different type of knowledge.
3Notice that the asymmetry in the CES function appears because we assume that
knowledge from own workers (Ait) is fully accessible by the firm while knowledge from
poached workers may be less accessible, i.e. p ∈ [0, 1].
4There is empirical evidence that shows how differences in legal systems influence the
rate of labor mobility of a region when learning-by-hiring is relevant. Hyde (1998), Gilson
(1999) and Valetta (2002) argue that Silicon Valley was originated in California precisely
because clauses not-to-compete have weak enforceability in that state. Almeida and Kogut
(1999) point out at the importance of “social institutions that support a viable flow of
ideas within the spatial confines of regional economies” for creating the externalities that
foster innovation (p.916).
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With such specifications, we obtain a functional form for output similar
to the one derived in Romer (1990), but instead of different types of capital
goods, we have different types of human capital.5 In the conventional spec-
ification, total human capital is implicitly defined as being proportional to
the sum of all the types of human capital, assuming perfect substitutability
among them. Instead, we allow for some level of complementarity among
different types of human capital. In our case the elasticity of substitution
between different types of experienced workers is 1
1−σ . We assume that they
are imperfect substitutes, that is, 0 < σ < 1.6 The output is given by:
Yit = [(ηitAit)
σ + p
∑
j 6=i
(λjitAjt)
σ]
α
σ (BtLit)
1−α. (2)
We assume decreasing returns to each input (0 < α < 1). The parameter
Bt converts raw quantities of unexperienced labor into efficiency units. We
assume it is the same for all firms, which means that all young workers have
the same level of education when entering the industry. Notice that even
though the production function has constant returns to scale, the number of
firms matters because it determines the variety of knowledge in the economy.
Moreover, we assume that without workers there is no access to knowledge.
Notice also that the CES functional form of the human capital measure
ensures that firm productivity is increasing with the variety of knowledge.
The interpretation is that exchange of knowledge matters for productivity.
We allow for the interaction of knowledge to happen only when two workers
work in the same firm, which is coherent with the idea that tacit knowledge
is important for innovation and needs face-to-face contact to be transmitted.
We assume perfect competition in the product market in order to isolate
the exchange of knowledge effect in the labor market. To simplify we assume
that all firms can sell all the product at a given price, which we normalize to
1.
At the beginning of each period there is a measure Li,t−1 of experienced
workers for each type of knowledge in the industry (i = 1, ...F ). Moreover,
there is a positive cost for workers to move from one firm to the other,
which we denote by m. It may include the real cost of changing the place of
residence as well as the subjective cost associated to it.
We consider the case of perfect competition in the labor market, so that
firms take wages as given. Let wit be the wage of young workers and ωit
5Funke and Strulik (2000) and Sorensen (1999) use the Romer model to develop an
endogenous growth model with human capital accumulation.
6Note that the production function evaluated at σ = 0 is not well-defined and the
Cobb-Douglas function cannot be derived.
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the wage of type i experienced workers paid by firm i in period t. Notice
that the wage of experienced workers ωit has to be greater than w
i
t to in-
duce experienced workers to work. Otherwise they would prefer to work as
unexperienced ones.
Let ωijt be the wage paid by a firm j to the experienced workers type i.
For this type of workers to move to firm j, they must be paid at least as much
as in firm i plus the mobility costs, that is, ωijt ≥ ωit + m. Since the labor
market is perfectly competitive, the former condition holds with equality
in equilibrium and an experienced worker is indifferent between moving or
staying. In such a case we assume that workers are willing to change the
firm.
Each firm i decides the amount ηit of own experienced workers to retain,
the amount λjit of experienced workers to poach from each firm j (j 6= i) and
the amount of young workers to hire Lit.
The problem of the firm is to maximize the discounted sum of future
profits. In our specification each period is independent from each other.
In particular we assume that the technological parameters Ait and Bt are
exogenous and do not depend on firm decisions. Moreover, we assume that
firms do not take into account how their decision on how many young workers
to hire today will affect the amount of their type of experienced workers in
the next period. The firm cannot write long-term contracts to make sure that
the workers will not leave the firm in the next period. Therefore, the firm
cannot forecast how many of the young workers today will remain working
in the firm tomorrow. Then the firm’s problem can be expressed as a period
by period maximization.7
Given the competitive wages wit, ωjt and ω
j
it such that ω
j
it ≥ ωjt +m and
ωit ≥ wit, the problem of the firm is the following:
maxηit,λjit,Lit,Kit
((ηitAit)
σ + p
∑
j 6=i(λ
j
itAjt)
σ)
α
σ (BtLit)
1−α−
−witLit − ωitηit −
∑
j 6=i ω
j
itλ
j
it.
The first order conditions for this problem are:
αησ−1it A
σ
it(BtLit)
1−α
((ηitAit)σ + p
∑
j 6=i(λ
j
itAjt)
σ)1−
α
σ
= ωit, (3)
pα(λjit)
σ−1Aσjt(BtLit)
1−α
((ηitAit)σ + p
∑
s 6=i(λ
s
itAst)
σ)1−
α
σ
= ωjt +m ∀j 6= i, (4)
(1− α)((ηitAit)σ + p
∑
j 6=i
(λjitAjt)
σ)
α
σB1−αt L
−α
it = w
i
t. (5)
7See section 5 for further discussion on this issue.
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Equations (3), (4) and (5) equalize marginal productivity to the marginal cost
of retained workers, poached workers and young workers, respectively. Notice
that we already introduce the equilibrium result on wages, ωjit = ωjt + m.
Notice that since marginal productivity of poached workers at λjit = 0 is
infinity for all i,j (see equation 4) and there is no cost of adapting variety of
knowledge, all firms poach workers from all the other firms in the industry to
access the whole range of knowledge.8 Moreover, firms always want to retain
some of their own workers because the marginal productivity of retained
workers when the industry retains zero workers is infinite (see equation 3).9
Since individual labor supply is inelastic, individuals only care about
maximizing their life-time income, which depends on which firm they start
working. In equilibrium it must happen that all workers within an industry
have the same life-time income in present value, where β is the consumer
discount rate.
wit +
ωi,t+1
1 + β
= wjt +
ωj,t+1
1 + β
, ∀i 6= j. (6)
Notice that although an experienced worker type i poached by firm j earns
ωijt = ωit +m, he incurs a cost m by moving, so the total disposable income
reduces to ωit. Thus, equation (6) refers to both stayers and movers.
Next we present the market clearing conditions for the labor market.
Equation (7) refers to the market for young workers and equation (8) to the
experienced workers’ market.
F∑
i=1
Lit = Nt, (7)∑
j 6=i
λijt + ηit = Li,t−1 ∀i = 1, ...F, (8)
In the left-hand side of equations (7) and (8) there is the total demand for
young workers and experienced workers type i, respectively. The right-hand
side shows the total supply of these types of workers. Equations (3) to (8)
determine the equilibrium of this economy.
8We could limit the number of firms from which to poach workers by introducing a cost
of adaptation of external knowledge which increases with the variety of knowledge. This
would complicate the analysis without giving any new insights into the model.
9These conditions are sufficient but not necessary to obtain positive labor mobility
in equilibrium. The necessary condition for positive labor mobility is that the marginal
productivity of the first worker type i willing to move is lower in her firm of origin than in
any other firm. Similarly, the condition for having some retained workers in equilibrium
is that the marginal productivity of the first retained worker is larger than the marginal
productivity of this type of worker in any other firm when all workers of his type are
working for that firm.
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3 The symmetric equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium all levels of knowledge are the same across firms,
although the type of knowledge keeps being different for each firm. In such
a case Ait = At ∀i. We also assume that there is no population growth
neither technological growth (Nt, Ft, Bt and At are constant overtime). Thus,
hereinafter we suppress the time subscripts.
In a symmetric equilibrium all firms hire the same amount of young work-
ers each period. This implies that there is the same amount of experienced
workers of each type at the beginning of each period (Li =
N
F
∀i). Moreover,
also due to symmetry, wages are the same for all types of experienced worker.
Definition 1 The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the vector of
variables (η, λ, L) and the prices (w,ω) that solve the following system of
equations:
αησ−1Aα(BL)1−α(ησ + p(F − 1)λσ)ασ−1 = ω, (9)
pαλσ−1Aα(BL)1−α(ησ + p(F − 1)λσ)ασ−1 = ω +m, (10)
(1− α)(ησ + p(F − 1)λσ)ασAαB1−αL−α = w, (11)
L =
N
F
, (12)
(F − 1)λ+ η = L. (13)
Equations (9) to (11) come from the firm’s problem and equations (12) and
(13) are the labor market clearing conditions. Note that equation (6) becomes
an identity in a symmetric equilibrium. We prove in the appendix that the
symmetric equilibrium for this economy exists. Moreover, we show that
under some conditions it is unique.
In the symmetric case we can rewrite the firm production function as:
Y =
(
A
B
)α
B
((
η
LE
)σ
+ p(F − 1)
(
λ
LE
)σ)ασ
LαEL
1−α, (14)
where LE is the total amount of experienced workers in the firm. We obtain
a standard Cobb-Douglass production function with two inputs: experienced
labor (LE) and young labor (L). The non-standard result is that the total
factor productivity (TFP) is composed of three elements: the learning-by-
doing, the technological level and the labor composition within the firm.
(A
B
)α denotes the learning-by-doing component of the TFP, B denotes the
technological level and finally (( η
LE
)σ + p(F − 1)( λ
LE
)σ)
α
σ describes the effect
of the firm composition of experienced labor on the TFP. Notice that when
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A
B
> 1 there is learning-by-doing in the industry. Moreover, when A and B
grow in the same proportion, then the learning-by-doing component is not
affected and the technological level increases.
We refer to the industry-specific experience premium as the real wage
growth a worker experiences in his life. Using equations (9) and (11) we
obtain that
ω
w
=
αL
(1− α)η
(
1 + p(F − 1)
(
λ
η
)σ) . (15)
The previous equation reveals that all the parameters of the model affect
the industry experience premium through changes in the composition of the
labor force within the firm.
Let us explain at this point why extending the model to more than one
industry would not affect our results on wage premium. Basically, the intro-
duction of several industries would endogenize the supply of young workers
per industry. In equilibrium the discounted sum of wages (which should also
include the cost of acquiring the required education level of the industry)
must be the same in each industry. This condition determines the supply of
young workers per industry. Notice also that the supply of young workers
determine the supply of experienced workers next period. Since the firm pro-
duction function has constant returns to scale, the marginal productivity of
each input is homogeneous of degree zero on both inputs. Moreover, we know
that under perfect competition wages equal the value of the marginal pro-
ductivity of the worker. Notice that by computing the experience premium
of an industry we eliminate the price component. Therefore, although the
level of wages within an industry will be affected by the general equilibrium
forces, the results on experience premium within an industry remain unaf-
fected. This result can also be seen on the expression above. The experience
premium is homogeneous of degree zero in young and experienced workers.
4 Results
Next, we analyze how industries with different levels of learning-by-hiring
capabilities, different mobility costs, different learning-by-doing possibilities,
and different initial productivity of workers have different experience premia.
We first solve analytically for the case of zero mobility costs. Then we simu-
late the model with positive mobility costs and pursue a comparative static
analysis on the symmetric equilibrium.
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4.1 The case of zero mobility costs
It is useful to obtain the solution of the model for the case of zero mobility
costs (m = 0). In such a case, it is possible to obtain an explicit solution
for the equilibrium. Using equations (9), (10), (12) and (13) we derive an
expression for λ, η and λ
η
.
λ =
p
1
1−σN/F
1 + (F − 1)p 11−σ
, (16)
η =
N/F
1 + (F − 1)p 11−σ
, (17)
λ
η
= p
1
1−σ . (18)
We can observe that in absence of mobility costs labor mobility only depends
on the ability of learning-by-hiring (p), the substitutability between different
types of workers (σ) and the size of the industry (N and F ). Notice that
technological variables (A and B) do not affect labor mobility in this case.
Labor mobility is increasing with the learning-by-hiring and decreasing with
the elasticity of substitution and the variety of knowledge. Obviously, with
positive mobility costs, the rate of poached workers over retained workers is
always lower than the value obtained in this section.
It can be proved that in the case of zero mobility costs, the equilibrium
amount of labor mobility coincides with the amount of labor mobility that
maximizes the human capital measure (H). In contrast, with positive mo-
bility costs, the equilibrium labor mobility is below this level, so the human
capital measure could be increased by increasing labor mobility. It would
not be efficient, however, since larger labor mobility would also increase the
total mobility costs.
To obtain the industry experience premium in the case of zero mobility
costs, we take equation (15) and substitute η and λ by their equilibrium value
(equations (16) and (17)).
ω
w
=
α
1− α. (19)
In the equilibrium with zero mobility costs the experience premium only
depends on the input share of experienced and young workers. Positive
mobility costs are therefore essential to have an impact of labor mobility on
wage growth.
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4.2 The comparative static analysis with mobility
costs
When mobility costs are positive it is not possible to solve explicitly for the
equilibrium. We resort to simulation exercises to examine the factors that
determine experience premium in our model. We provide a formal proof of
the results for the case α > σ in the appendix.10
For the simulation we take standard values of the basic parameters. We
assume each period has 25 years. We need α > 0.5 in order to have positive
returns to experience (see equation 19), therefore we take the value α =
0.6. Since there is no previous literature for σ, we take an arbitrary value
for the baseline parametrization, 0.5, which corresponds to an elasticity of
substitution among different types of experienced workers of 2. We give
arbitrary numbers to the rest of the parameters in order to have interior
solutions: A = 100, B = 1, p = 0.4, m = 2, N = 100 and F = 10.
Under this specification mobility costs represent around 11.5% of the total
wage of the poached worker (ω + m). Results are robust to changes in the
parametrization baseline.11
Figures 1 and 2 show the relationships between the parameters of the
model and the two main variables: labor mobility and experience premium.
As expected, all the parameters that affect positively the productivity of
poached workers induce larger labor mobility. The learning-by-doing, the
technological level, the variety of knowledge and the learning-by-hiring are
in this group. In contrast, mobility costs and the elasticity of substitution
have a negative relationship with labor mobility.
Insert here figure 1.
More surprising are the results on industry experience premium. The
dashed lines in figure 2 correspond to the experience premium in absence of
mobility costs. The first thing to be noticed is that the experience premium
with positive mobility costs is lower than the experience premium with no
mobility costs. The intuition behind is that larger mobility costs reduce the
total demand for experienced workers, and thus the experience premium.
Insert here figure 2.
10We obtain the same qualitative results in all simulations, regardless of having α > σ
or α < σ. However, the analytical proof for the latter case is weaker since it requires
additional assumptions. It is available upon request.
11Simulation was run for several values of the parameters with no major changes in the
qualitative results. Check appendix B2 for more details. Particular attention was given
to check robustness in two cases: when α > σ and α < σ. Values for α and σ ranged from
0.6 to 0.8 and from 0.3 to 0.8, respectively.
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While the learning-by-doing, the technological level and the mobility
costs have a monotonic relationship with the experience premium, the other
parameters under study reveal a non-monotonic relationship. We observe
that experience premium presents a U-shape relationship with the variety of
knowledge, the learning-by-hiring and the elasticity of substitution between
different types of workers.
Equation (15) reveals that most of the effects of the parameters on ex-
perience premium go through the amount of retained workers (η) and the
relative amount of labor mobility (λ
η
). Both channels are a measure of the
mobility of workers in the industry, which is the main determinant of the in-
dustry experience premium. An increase in the mobility of workers has two
effects on the firm: a larger productivity level12 and a larger bill for mobility
costs. This creates a trade-off on the net productivity of experienced work-
ers. Results on experience premium depend on which of these two effects
dominates.
To analyze the effect of mobility costs on experience premium recall that
an increase in mobility costs reduces the amount of labor mobility. This
in turn provokes a decrease in the human capital measure of the firm and
an ambiguous effect on the total mobility costs bill. It turns out that the
former effect dominates and the industry experience premium is decreasing
in mobility costs.13
The learning-by-doing and the technological level, both affect positively
labor mobility. This means that an increase in these parameters translates
into larger productivity (larger H) and a larger bill of mobility costs. We
observe, however, that the former force dominates.14 Hence, the experience
premium is increasing with the learning-by-doing and the technological level.
The result that experience premium is increasing with the learning-by-doing
is consistent with the human capital theory, which relates wages to produc-
tivity. With regard to our parameter on the technological level, Connolly
and Gottschalk (2006) show that wage growth is more important for more-
educated workers. This is consistent with our result that experience premium
is increasing with B if we interpret B as the education level of young workers.
12Recall that with positive mobility costs the optimal amount of labor mobility is below
the one that maximizes human capital (H). Thus, increasing the equilibrium level of labor
mobility always increases H.
13Actually, if we allow mobility costs to get to huge levels (above 20-50% of total wage
(ω+m)), we would observe a U-shape relationship between mobility costs and experience
premium. In such a case, assumption 3 in the appendix B2 does not hold. We consider
that such cost levels are unreasonable since one period is 25 years, so we do not report
them in our results.
14In rare occasions we found that too low values of technological level and learning-by-
doing reverse the results.
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In contrast to the previous results, we obtain a non-monotonous relation-
ship when we analyze the variety of knowledge, the learning-by-hiring and
the elasticity of substitution among different types of experienced workers.
An increase in learning-by-hiring (p) affects positively the amount of labor
mobility. This implies an increase in the effective measure of human capi-
tal and a larger mobility costs bill. For low levels of learning-by-hiring the
latter force dominates and experience premium is decreasing in p. However,
as learning-by-hiring becomes more important, the productivity gain of the
increased labor mobility compensates for the increase in mobility costs and
then experience premium is increasing in p.
Similarly, the intuition for a U-shape relationship between variety of
knowledge and experience premium can be understood by analyzing this
trade-off between productivity and mobility costs. Recall that we find that
variety of knowledge increases labor mobility. We obtain that for low values
of F , increasing this parameter raises mobility costs more than productiv-
ity. However, as F is large enough, any increase in mobility costs is more
than compensated by the increase in productivity. This explains the U-shape
relationship between experience premium and variety of knowledge.
A similar intuition is behind the effect of the elasticity of substitution
among different types of experienced workers. As different types of workers
become more substitutable, there is a reduction in labor mobility in equilib-
rium and consequently there is a loss in productivity and a decrease in total
mobility costs. When complementarieties are very strong, the former effect
is larger, thus experience premium decreases. However, when the degree of
substitutability of workers becomes sufficiently large, the loss in productivity
is more than compensated by the decrease in mobility costs. As a result,
the elasticity of substitution has a U-shape relationship with the experience
premium.
5 Discussion
Let us briefly discuss in this section the two main shortcomings of the
model.15 First of all, we assume that all knowledge is industry-specific. This
strong assumption ensures that no worker will find it worthwhile to change
industry. Therefore, we do not allow for inter-industry labor mobility in our
model. This assumption allows us to analyze in a partial analysis (one indus-
try only) the relationship between labor mobility and experience premium.
We acknowledge that this constitutes an important limitation of the model.
A more complete analysis should include both, general and industry-specific
15I thank an anonimous referee for pointing out them to me.
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knowledge, what would give rise to possibly different combinations of inter-
and intra-industry labor mobility. Our results on experience premium should
therefore be seen as partial equilibrium results.16
Secondly, we set up the problem of the firm to be a static one. For that,
we assume that firms cannot write long-term contracts to prevent workers
from leaving the firm in the next period. Moreover, firms do not take into
account that their hiring decision in period t determines the supply of expe-
rienced workers in period t + 1. However, being each firm the only provider
of each type of experienced workers, a dynamic maximization problem of the
firm would be more realistic. When choosing today how many young workers
to hire, firms are determining how many experience workers they can hire to-
morrow. In a dynamic setting firms would take this into account. Moreover,
in a model where labor mobility implies at the same time knowledge diffu-
sion, a dynamic setting would introduce a second dimension to the problem.
Firms may want to control the diffusion of knowledge by affecting the supply
of experienced workers and deciding to retain them. We believe this would
be especially important in the case of imperfect product market competi-
tion, where prevention of knowledge diffusion could become an entry barrier
and/or a new mechanism of market competition. Actually, there are several
papers dealing with this issue in a two-period model with two firms (Combes
and Duranton, 2006; Fosfuri et al., 2001; Fosfuri and Ronde, 2004; Gers-
bach and Schmutzler, 2003). Although we gain simplicity by setting a static
problem for the firm, the drawback is that we cannot explain any strategic
behavior of the firm.
6 Conclusion
Why do some industries give larger returns to industry experience than oth-
ers? We propose a model where labor mobility across firms affects wage
growth in an industry. The determinants of labor mobility within an indus-
try explain then the differences in experience premium across industries. We
find that experience premium is decreasing in mobility costs, while increasing
in the learning-by-doing and the technological level of the industry. Inter-
estingly, wage growth presents a U-shape relationship with the learning-by-
hiring, the substitutability between different types of workers and the variety
16In a general equilibrium framework, when a worker decides to change industry, the loss
of productivity (wage) due to unusable industry-specific knowledge must be compensated
by a greater productivity of his/her general knowledge in the new industry. Depending on
how industry-specific and general knowledge enter in the production function we should
obtain different patterns of inter-industry labor mobility.
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of knowledge in the industry.
Additionally to the results on industry experience premium, in the sym-
metric equilibrium we obtain an extended TFP specification. Our extended
TFP adds two variables to the traditional technological level of the firm.
On the one hand, the learning-by-doing capability that a firm offers to their
workers affects the TFP. On the other hand, the firm composition of ex-
perienced labor also determines firms’ TFP. This result suggests that labor
mobility may partially explain the differences in TFP across countries.
A Proof of the existence and uniqueness of
the symmetric equilibrium.
We first rewrite equations (9)-(13) by introducing one new variable: x = λ
η
.
αAαB1−α
( η
L
)α−1
(1 + p(F − 1)xσ)ασ−1 = ω, (20)
pαAαB1−αxσ−1
( η
L
)α−1
(1 + p(F − 1)xσ)ασ−1 = ω +m, (21)
(1− α)AαB1−α
( η
L
)α
(1 + p(F − 1)xσ)ασ = w, (22)
L =
N
F
, (23)
(F − 1)x+ 1 = L
η
. (24)
Using equations (20) and (21) we equalize ω, and substitute η/L using equa-
tion (24). Then we obtain one equation depending only on x, which can be
written as:
pxσ−1 = 1 +
m(1 + p(F − 1)xσ)σ−ασ
αAαB1−α(1 + (F − 1)x)1−α . (25)
Next, we show that such equation has a solution, so the symmetric equilib-
rium exists. Let us denote any solution of equation (25) by x∗. Recall that we
know from solving the model with zero mobility costs that if the equilibrium
exists, x∗ must be smaller than p
1
1−σ , and given that p ∈ [0, 1] and σ < 1, we
know that x∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, we focus on this region to find the equilibrium.
Since the functions are continuous, to prove that the equilibrium exists
it is enough to show that in equation (25) LHS(x = 0) > RHS(x = 0) and
LHS(x = 1) < RHS(x = 1). This means that they must cross at least once,
so the equilibrium exists. At x = 0 the LHS has a vertical asymptote and
the RHS is finite. At x = 1 the LHS = p < 1 and it is trivial to check that
the RHS is larger than 1. Therefore, the equilibrium exists.
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Next, we prove uniqueness of equilibrium. The LHS of equation (25) is
always positive, decreasing in x and convex.
∂LHS
∂x
= p(σ − 1)xσ−2 < 0.
∂2LHS
∂x2
= p(1− σ)(2− σ)xσ−3 > 0.
Moreover, it is straight forward to check that the limit of the LHS when x
goes to zero is infinity and the limit of the LHS when x goes to infinity is
zero.
The RHS of equation (25) is always positive and the first derivative is the
following:
∂RHS
∂x
= −(F − 1)m(1 + (F − 1)px
σ)−
α
σ Ψ(x)
AαB1−ααx(1 + (F − 1)x)2−α ,
where
Ψ(x) = pxσ(α− σ + (F − 1)(1− σ)x) + x(1− α).
The slope of the RHS depends on the sign of Ψ(x). Notice that Ψ(x) is
always positive when α ≥ σ. On the other hand, when α < σ, it is easy to
check that Ψ(x) is negative for all x < x and positive for x > x, where x is
the solution to Ψ(x) = 0.
Assumption 1 Ψ(x∗) = px∗σ(α−σ+ (F − 1)(1−σ)x∗) +x∗(1−α) > 0 for
all x∗ that solve equation (25).
Under assumption 1 the RHS is decreasing in equilibrium. Moreover, the
LHS is steeper than the RHS in the first equilibrium. For both functions
to cross a second time it must happen that the RHS is now steeper than
the LHS. Hence, if the equilibrium is to be unique it can not happen that
the
∣∣∂RHS
∂x
∣∣ > ∣∣∂LHS
∂x
∣∣ at any x∗ that solves equation (25). Assumption 2
guarantees that
∣∣∂RHS
∂x
∣∣ < ∣∣∂LHS
∂x
∣∣ at all x∗. Thus, when assumption 2 holds,
the symmetric equilibrium is unique.
Assumption 2 Ψ(x∗) < A
αB1−αα(1−σ)(1+(F−1)x∗)2−αpx∗σ−1
(F−1)m(1+(F−1)px∗σ)−ασ for all x
∗ that solve
equation (25).
To sum up, we proved that the equilibrium always exists. When α > σ, we
need assumption 2 to prove that the equilibrium is unique. When α < σ,
we need assumptions 1 and 2 to prove uniqueness of equilibrium. These
assumptions were satisfied for all the simulation exercises performed.
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B Comparative analysis with mobility costs.
Analytical proofs for the case α > σ.
In this section we provide the analytical proofs of the results of the compar-
ative analysis in the case of α > σ and positive mobility costs. We study
how parameter changes affects labor mobility and experience premium in
equilibrium. Some of the results require some assumptions to hold.
B.1 Results on labor mobility
We rewrite equation (25) to have G = LHS − RHS = 0 and differentiate
with respect to the parameter. The sign of this derivative indicates how the
parameter affects x∗.
Let ∆ be the following expression:
∆ =
(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)−ασ
AαB1−α(1 + (F − 1)x)1−α .
Notice that given the restrictions assumed on the parameters of the model
∆ is always positive.
Variation of p
∂G
∂p
= xσ−1 +
xσ(F − 1)m(α− σ)
ασ
∆.
Since we consider the case of α > σ, it is trivial to check that this derivative
is positive. This implies that learning-by-hiring affects positively the labor
mobility in equilibrium.
Variation of m
∂G
∂m
= − 1
α
(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)∆ < 0.
This derivative is negative, so an increase in mobility costs always results in
a decrease in labor mobility.
Variation of A
∂G
∂A
=
m(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)
A
∆ > 0.
This derivative is positive, so an increase in the learning-by-doing always
results in larger labor mobility in equilibrium.
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Variation of B
∂G
∂B
=
(1− α)m(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)
αB
∆ > 0.
This derivative is positive, so an increase in the technological level always
results in larger labor mobility in equilibrium.
Variation of F
∂G
∂F
= −m(px
σ(σ − α(1 + (F − 1)(1− σ)x)− (1− α)σx)
ασ(1 + (F − 1)x) ∆.
Since α > σ, it is trivial to check that this derivative is positive. Notice
additionally that the effect on total mobility (Fλ) is also positive.
Variation of σ
∂G
∂σ
= pxσ−1Log[x] +
m(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)
ασ2
∆∗
∗ ((F − 1)pσ(α− σ)xσLog[x]− α(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)Log[1 + (F − 1)pxσ]).
Notice that since in equilibrium 0 < x∗ < 1, then Log[x∗] < 0 and
Log[1 + (F − 1)px∗σ] > 0. Then, it is easy to check that since α > σ
the derivative has a negative sign. This means that the more substitutable
are the different types of experienced workers, the less labor mobility there
will be in equilibrium.
B.2 Results on experience premium
From equations (20) and (22) we obtain:
ω
w
=
α(1 + (F − 1)x)
(1− α)(1 + p(F − 1)xσ) . (26)
We use this expression together with the results on labor mobility to check
how the experience premium depends on each parameter.
Let us define Γ = 1− pxσ−1(σ− (F − 1)(1−σ)x). Hereinafter we assume
that Γ is positive in equilibrium.
Assumption 3 Γ = 1 − px∗σ−1(σ − (F − 1)(1 − σ)x∗) > 0 for all x∗ that
solve equation (25).
This assumption is always satisfied except for really low levels of labor mo-
bility. During the simulation exercises, violation of assumption 3 occurred
only in the following cases:
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• with large mobility costs. They must represent above 20% of the total
wage of a poached worker (ω+m) in order to change the results. Since
each period represents 25 year span, we do not consider this violation
of assumption 3 problematic.
• with strong substitutability between types of experienced workers. Al-
though Γ becomes slightly negative for cases with strong substitutabil-
ity between types of experienced workers, all results on experience pre-
mium hold.
• with small technological parameters (A and B). In rare cases, too
small values of A and B violate assumption 3 and then the relationship
between these parameters and wage premium becomes negative.
Variation of p
∂ ω
w
∂p
=
α(F − 1)(∂x
∂p
Γ− (1 + (F − 1)x)xσ)
(1− α)(1 + p(F − 1)xσ)2 .
We showed in appendix B.1 that ∂x
∂p
is positive. Then the effect of learning-by-
hiring on experience premium is ambiguous. When ∂x
∂p
Γ > (1 + (F − 1)x)xσ,
then the learning-by-hiring affects positively the equilibrium experience pre-
mium. Otherwise, the effect is negative.
Variation of m
∂ ω
w
∂m
=
α(F − 1)Γ
(1− α)(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)2
∂x
∂m
< 0.
This derivative is negative. Therefore, experience premium is decreasing in
mobility costs.
Variation of A
∂ ω
w
∂A
=
α(F − 1)Γ
(1− α)(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)2
∂x
∂A
> 0.
We obtain a positive impact of learning-by-doing on experience premium.
Variation of B
∂ ω
w
∂B
=
α(F − 1)Γ
(1− α)(1 + (F − 1)pxσ)2
∂x
∂B
> 0.
We obtain a positive impact of technological level on experience premium.
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Variation of F
∂ ω
w
∂F
=
α[(F − 1) ∂x
∂F
Γ− x(pxσ−1 − 1)]
(1− α)(1 + p(F − 1)xσ)2 .
We showed in appendix B.1 that ∂x
∂F
> 0. Then the effect of F on experi-
ence premium is ambiguous. Notice that the first term in the numerator is
positive. Recall that in equilibrium x < p
1
1−σ . Then the last term in the
numerator is negative. For low levels of F the negative effect dominates and
variety of knowledge affects negatively the equilibrium experience premium,
while for high levels of F the total effect of variety of knowledge on experience
premium is positive.
Variation of σ
∂ ω
w
∂σ
=
α(F − 1)( ∂x
∂σ
Γ− pxσ(1 + (F − 1)x)Log[x])
(1− α)(1 + p(F − 1)xσ)2 .
We showed in appendix B.1 that ∂x
∂σ
< 0. Then the sign of this derivative
is ambiguous. If |pxσ(1 + (F − 1)x)Log[x]| > ∣∣ ∂x
∂σ
Γ
∣∣, the elasticity of substi-
tution affects positively the equilibrium experience premium. Otherwise the
effect is negative.
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Figure 1: λ
η
as a function of the industry characteristics. Simulation results.
Dashed lines show the equilibrium with zero mobility costs.
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